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Lee: Resolving the Dissonant Constitutional Chords Inherent in the Fed

RESOLVING THE DISSONANT CONSTITUTIONAL CHORDS
INHERENT IN THE FEDERAL ANTI-BOOTLEGGING STATUTE
IN UNITED STATES v. MOGHADAM
The layman's constitutional view is that what he likes is
constitutional and that which he doesn't like is
unconstitutional.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

With the advent of affordable, publicly available music recording technology, the number of "bootlegged" recordings on the market has grown. 2 A bootleg recording generally contains live concert
performances never intended for commercial release. 3 Differences
exist between bootleg, pirate and counterfeit recordings. 4 A coun1. Hugo L. Black, Justice Black, 85 Tomorrow, Has No Plans to Leave Court, N.Y.
Feb. 26, 1971, at 38.
2. See Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Releases Year-End Piracy

TIMES,

Statistics, at http://www.riaa.com/PR_- Story.cfm?id=279 (last visited Oct. 7, 2000).
For example, by mid-1998, no bootleg CD-Recordables ("CD-R") discs were seized.
See Recording Industry Association of America, R!AA Releases 1999 Mid-Year AntiPiracy Statistics, at http://www.riaa.com/Protect-Campaign-6.cfm (last visited Oct.
7, 2000). By mid-1999, 10,485 bootleg CD-Rs were seized. See id. "The number of
counterfeit, pirate and bootleg CD-Rs seized in 1999 grew by more than 800% over
[ 1998] figures." See Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Releases YearEnd Piracy Statistics, at http://www.riaa.com/PR-Story.cfm?id=279 (last visited Oct.
7, 2000). A CD-R is a disc that can be written with audio or data information only
once. See ALAN FREEMAN, THE COMPUTER GLOssARY 55 (8th ed. 1998). Machines
that can copy official audio compact discs onto blank CD-Rs are generally inexpensive. See Recording Industry Association of America, CD-R Piracy, at http://
www.riaa.com/Protect-CDR.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 2000).
3. See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 209-10 n.2 (1985) (defining
"bootleg" as "contain[ing] an unauthorized copy of a commercially unreleased
performance" from sources including "concert performances, motion picture
soundtracks, or television appearances"); Susan M. Deas, Jazzing Up the Copyright
Act? Resolving the Uncertaintiesof the United States Anti-Bootlegging Law, 20 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 567, 573 (1998) (noting that all it takes to make bootlegs "is
attending a live performance, surreptitiously recording it, reproducing the master
tape, then marketing the copies"); Todd D. Patterson, Comment, The Uruguay
Ro.nd's Anti-Rontlep
Ping
Provision: A Victory for Musical Artists and Record Companies,
15 Wis. IrNr'L L.J. 371, 373 (1997) (stating, "[a] bootleg tape, record, or compact
disc (CD) generally contains live music by a performer or performers that has
neither been nor ever was intended to be commercially produced and made available to the public.") (footnote omitted).
4. See David Schwartz, Note, Strange Fixation:Bootleg Sound Recordings Enjoy the
Benefits ofImproving Technology, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 611, 622 (1995) (discussing confusion between different types of music piracy); cf Jerry D. Brown, United States
Copyright Law After GATT: Why A New ChapterEleven Means Bankruptcy for Bootleggers,
16 Loy. L.A. ENr. L.J. 1, 4 (1995) (categorizing bootlegging as three classes of
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terfeit recording is an unauthorized copy of a legitimate album.

With counterfeit recordings, artists and record companies do not
collect royalties that would otherwise be included in the price of a
legitimate copy. 6 Pirated recordings, however, generally compile
songs from various albums, usually by the same artist.7 Similar to
counterfeit recordings, record companies and artists do not receive
royalties from these unauthorized compilations.8 Bootlegs, unlike
music piracy: counterfeiting, pirating and classic bootlegging). Brown categorizes
the unauthorized recording of a live performance as classic bootlegging. See id.
Courts and legal commentators use the phrase "bootlegging" interchangeably. See
Carte P. Goodwin, Comment, Live in Concert . . .and Beyond: A New Standard of
Contributory Copyright Infringement, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 345, 345 n.4 (1999).
5. See Patterson, supra note 3, at 378 (defining "counterfeit" recording);
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 620 (differentiating between different types of record
piracy). Generally, counterfeit recordings are sold for less than the retail price.
See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 345 (stating counterfeit recordings are priced substantially lower than retail prices).
6. See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 346 (commenting that over $300 million in
revenue is lost each year from bootleg phonorecords in United States) (citing
Grayzone, Inc., The Federal Anti-Piracy and Bootleg FAQ, at http://
www.grayzone.com/faqindex.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2000)); Patterson, supra note
3, at 374 (noting artist could feel bootlegged performance represented sub-par
execution of songs and that music companies lose potential profits with bootlegs);
cf.Greg Kot, Bootleg Bounty Illicit Industry Delights Fans, But Not Record Industry, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 28, 1995, § 5, at 1 (quoting music journalist Clinton Heylin commenting that "[o]n an artistic level, never trust the artist, trust the tale" and noting that
most fans agree that bootleg version of famous song is "better" than official version). Additionally, record companies wish to limit their artists' output such that
each release is surrounded by "big-budget promotion campaigns." See id.
In the United States, a combined $400 million in revenue is lost annually from
counterfeit sound recordings and live performance bootlegs. See Patterson, supra
note 3, at 413; see also Brown, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that in 1993, global music
industry lost $2 billion to bootlegging). It is unclear if the Brown figure refers to
sales lost strictly from bootlegging or music piracy in general. See also Brown, supra
note 4, at 14 (stating that China has $347 million revenue from bootleg sales);
Goodwin, supra note 4, at 362-64 (noting bootleg recordings exports from Luxembourg cost global music industry almost $500 million in 1996; Italian and German
exports in 1996 cost industry $51 million and $31 million, respectively); Patterson,
supra note 3, at 399 (noting German bootleg market worth in 1991 as $85.7 million
annually and Italian bootleg market worth in 1994 as close to $150 million annually). Generally, it costs five dollars to manufacture and package a bootleg, which
is then sold for ten dollars to an intermediary and sold by a retailer, usually a small
independent store, for double to triple that amount. See Kot, supra note 6, at 1.
7. See Dowling, 473 U.S. at 210 n.2 (distinguishing "bootleg" from "pirated"
record, noting that "[a pirated record is] an unauthorized copy of a performance
already commercially released."); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 621 (defining pirates
as those who release unauthorized compilations of previously released songs, usually by same artist); cf Brown, supra note 4, at 4 (describing piracy as unauthorized
duplication or sale of unreleased copyrighted works).
8. See Patterson, supra note 3, at 379 (noting that pirates pay neither royalties
nor musicians, so compilations sell for less than retail price); Schwartz, supranote
4, at 621 (commenting that pirate compilations are cheaper than official releases).
Even bands that allow taping of their concerts unkindly view bootleggers. See Kot,
supra note 6, at 1 ("We're sick of bootlegs. Some people think that's a contradic-
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counterfeit or pirated recordings, are studio or live performances
not intended for public release. 9 Similarly, music companies and
artists do not receive royalties from bootlegs. 10
This Note examines United States v. Moghadam," which held
that the United States Constitution's Commerce Clause provided
sufficient constitutional authority to uphold the federal anti-bootlegging statute.1 2 The court's holding raised the issue of whether a
statute, essentially a copyright law, may derive authority from a
source other than the Copyright Clause.13 Section II examines the
facts behind Moghadam's prosecution.1 4 Second, in Section III,
the Note explores the procedural and judicial history behind the
federal anti-bootlegging statute's enactment. 15 Third, in Sections
V and V, this Note examines the court's analysis in upholding the
anti-bootlegging statute under the Commerce Clause. 16 Finally,
tion because we allow people to tape our concerts, but the tapers for the most part
are totally ethical because they trade the tapes [and] they don't sell them for a
profit.") (quoting Grateful Dead spokesman Dennis McNally).
9. See Dowling, 473 U.S. at 209 n.2 (defining "bootlegging" as making of "unauthorized cop [ies] of a commercially unreleased performance."); United States v.
Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999) (using Dowling bootleg definition throughout analysis); Deas, supra note 3, at 573 (defining bootleg as "recording[s] of a live performance made without the consent of the performer");
Brown, supra note 4, at 4 (defining "[b]ootlegging in the classic sense as the unauthorized copy of a live performance of a copyrighted work"); Goodwin, supra note
4, at 345 (noting bootlegs are created by unauthorized recordings at live concerts,
live radio or live television broadcasts); Patterson, supra note 3, at 374-76 (noting
that bootlegged recordings contain live musical performances never intended for
commercial or public release); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 613 (categorizing "bootleg" as "tape, record, or compact disc (CD) [that] contains music or dialogue by a
performer or performers that has never been commercially available").
10. See Patterson, supa note 3, at 374 (noting that "performer [generally] ...
never receives any proceeds or royalties from the sale of [ ] bootlegged music and
live concerts."). But see Schwartz, supa note 4, at 614 (commenting that
"[w] hether the bootlegger deprives artists of profits by releasing material that the
artist has no intention of releasing anyway is debatable . .

").

11. 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), reh'g and reh'gen banc denied, 193 F.3d 525
(11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 120 S. Ct. 1529 (2000).
12. See id. at 1282 (holding that Commerce Clause provided sufficient constifnrther discussion of the
Fnr
tqtlitel
for. anti-bootloinsu-ort
tutional
._ ..
.
.. .
..
. .o00l --- o
.
. .
. .
.. . ...
Moghadam court's conclusion that the Commerce Clause supported the federal
anti-bootlegging statute, see infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
13. For an examination of the Moghadam holding, see infra notes 152-72 and
accompanying text.
14. For further discussion of the case facts, see infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
15. For an exploration of the procedural and judiciary history behind the
anti-bootlegging statute's enactment, see infra Sections II-Ill.
16. For a review and critique of the court's analysis, see infra notes 112-207
and accompanying text.
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Moghadam's impact upon the music industry is considered in Sec17
tion VI.
II.

FACTS

Ali Moghadam was convicted of trafficking in bootleg compact
18
discs containing live musical performances of popular artists.
Moghadam pled guilty in district court but preserved his right to
appeal on the ground that his conviction derived from an unconstitutional statute. 19 Specifically, Moghadam argued that Congress
lacked the constitutional authority to enact the anti-bootlegging
17. For a discussion of the impact of the Moghadam holding, see infra notes
208-18 and accompanying text.
18. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing criminal statute under which Moghadam was convicted). The relevant section
of 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, which is the criminal corollary to 17 U.S.C. § 1101, makes
the fixation of the "sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance"
for "purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain" a federal crime.
18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Moghadam was convicted in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, an opinion is not on
file. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1270. The particular facts behind his conviction
remain unreported by any judicial opinion.
19. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (arguing that statute did not fall under
legislative power of Congress under Article I, section 8 of United States Constitution); see also Paul Farhi, CD Bootleggers Face the Music Supply of Illegal Recordings
Shrinks After Customs Crackdown, WASH. PosT, July 14, 1997, at Al (stating "[t]hree

others [including Moghadam] are contesting the charges and awaiting trial").
Moghadam was arrested during the execution of Operation Goldmine, a sting
operation designed to capture key figures in the underground music bootleg industry. See Farhi, supra note 19, at Al. Operation Goldmine persuaded eleven
international and American bootleggers to meet a record distributor from Orlando, Florida. See id. Upon their arrival, the United States Customs Service arrested them. See id.; see also Stan Soocher, Appeals Court Backs Anti-Bootlegging
Statute, 15 No. 3. ENT-.L. & FIN. 3, 3 (June 1999) (commenting that only
Moghadam appealed out of thirteen defendants convicted in Operation
Goldmine). Over 800,000 illegal compact discs were recovered from Orlando
warehouses. See Farhi, supra note 18, at Al. The compact discs, containing per-

formances by musical artists Tori Amos and the Beastie Boys, had a total street
value of $20 million. See Soocher, supra note 19, at 3. Interestingly, Moghadam
was the first to constitutionally challenge the federal anti-bootlegging statute given
that the first person charged under the statute was Keith Taruski in 1995. See Patterson, supra note 3, at 410; Kot, supra note 6, at 1 (commenting that Taruski was
indicted and charged for illegal importation of live performance compact discs
and conspiracy).
In 1997, an Ali Moghadam, most likely the same person captured in Opera-

tion Goldmine, was arrested in Los Angeles for unauthorized copying of bootleg
performances by various musical artists. See Karen Denne, Man Denies Bootlegging
Compact Discs Worth $218,000, L.A. DAILY NEws, Oct. 17, 1992, at N3. Moghadam

allegedly ran an international distribution ring for bootleg compact discs. See id.
In just one year, Moghadam evidently manufactured over 20,000 illegal compact
discs, with over 8700 seized during his arrest. See id.
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statute. 20 Moghadam appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit after the district court denied his mo21
tion to dismiss.
III.

BACKGROUND

The anti-bootlegging statute imposes penalties upon any unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and videos
of live musical performances. 22 This section first examines the civil
federal anti-bootlegging statute, 17 U.S.C. § 1101.23 Next, this sec-

tion examines the criminal federal anti-bootlegging statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2319A, along with the statute's underlying constitutional
framework. 24 The section concludes by exploring past case opin25
ions that examine the constitutional sources of various statutes.
Congress, in response to the burgeoning flow of pirated material, passed the Sound Recording Act of 1971, which granted federal copyright protection to sound recordings. 26 Unlike bootleg
recordings, sound recordings are sanctioned performances re20. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (reviewing respondent's argument on appeal). For further discussion of the court's analysis of Moghadam's argument, see
infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
21. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (noting lower court's denial of
Moghadam's motion to dismiss indictment).
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994) (imposing civil penalties for those persons
violating statute's precepts); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (copying language of 17 U.S.C. § 1101, except imposing criminal sanctions). For the
relevant statutory language, see infra note 29.
23. For the relevant statutory language of the civil federal anti-bootlegging
statute, see infra note 29 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the federal anti-bootlegging statute and its constitutional origins, see infra notes 26-92 and accompanying text. The section generally
refers to both criminal and civil codifications of the statute, unless specifically
noted otherwise.
25. For a discussion of past cases regarding the constitutional sources of various other statutes, see infra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
26. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (superseded and codified by Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994)). The
relevant portion of the 1971 statute defining sound recording:
[Granting copyright owner the exclusive right to] duplicate the sound
.. coi jn a ta__g.blc C-m. that d;recdy or ;n-1-tly recaqptures the actual sounds fixed in the recording ....
'Sound recordings' are works that result from the fixation of a series of
musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture. 'Reproductions of sound recordings' are material objects in which sounds other than those accompanying a motion
picture are fixed by any method now known or later developed ....
Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140(a) & (e), 85 Stat. 391, 391 (superseded and codified by Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (7) (1994)).
See also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 563 n.17 (1973) (noting that Congress was "spurred to action by the growth of record piracy .... .") (citation omit-
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duced to a tangible form for authorized commercial release. 27
While Congress protected sound recordings from illegal copying
and distribution, the enacted statute lacked protection for live performances. 28 Eventually, Congress recognized the detrimental impact of bootleg recordings and enacted the first federal antibootlegging statute, 17 U.S.C. § 1101; thus, Congress expanded the
scope of the antecedent Sound Recording Act of 1971.29 Section
2319A of Title 18 of the United States Code parallels § 1101, but
ted); H.R. REP. No. 92487, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567
(stating reliable trade estimates of music piracy in excess of $100 million).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (defining "sound recordings"
using identical language of Sound Recording Act of 1971).
28. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561-62 (declaring that Writing includes "any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor .

. .

. Thus,

recordings of artistic performances may be within the reach of the [Copyright
Clause]."). For a discussion of the scope of "sound recordings," see supranotes 2627 and accompanying text. For the definition of "bootlegging," see supra note 9
and accompanying text.
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994). The statute states in pertinent part:
Anyone, who, without the consent of the performer or performers involved -

(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance
in a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies or phonorecords of such
a performance from an unauthorized fixation,
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the sound or
sounds of a live musical performance, or
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or offers
to rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as described in paragraph (1), regardless of whether the fixations occurred in the United
States, shall be subject to [specified penalties].
17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1994).
Before enactment of federal protection, state laws existed, which protected
live performances from illegal recording. See Patterson, supra note 3, at 411 (stating that musical performers have previously used unfair competition laws and common law copyright laws for protection). Currently, thirty states and the District of
Columbia have passed anti-bootlegging statutes. See ALA. CODE § 13A-8-81 (a) (2)
(1999); ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-3705(A) (1999) (noting that "performer of live performance is presumed to own rights to record performance"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 537-510(b) (1) (Michie 1999), amended by 1999 Ark. Acts 1578; CAL.. PENAL CODE
§ 653(s) & (u) (West 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3814(b) (1999); FLA. STAT. ch.
540.11(2) (a) (3) (2000); 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/16-7(a) (4) (West 1999); IND.
CODE §§ 35-43-4-1 (b) (8) (B), 35434-2 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3748 (1999);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 434.445(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1999); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 223.5 (West 1999); MD. ANN. CODE § 467A(a)(2) (1999); MAss. GEN. LAws ch.
266, § 143B (1999); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 752.1052 (West 1999); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-23-87 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-142 (1999); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 352-A:2 (1999) (limited to sound recordings of performances fixed prior to
February 15, 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-21 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3016B-5 (Michie 1999); N.Y. PENAL Law § 275.00 (McKinney 1999) (criminalizing
unauthorized recordings of, among others, live performances); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-433(a) (1999); N.D. CEr. CODE § 47-21.1-02 (1999); OKLa. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 1978 (1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 164.869 (1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4116(d.1)
(2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-915 (Law. Co-op. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14139 (1999); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.93 (Vernon 1999); VA. CODE ANN.
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imposes additional criminal penalties, including a five-year prison
term for the first offense. 30 Contrary to past federal copyright protection laws, the federal anti-bootlegging statute does not3 rely upon
the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution. '
The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution allows
Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]" 3 2 Two centuries of judicial and legislative interpretation firmly embedded into
law the concept that copyright protection is granted only to works
"fixed" in some tangible medium. 33 This interpretation finds the
Copyright Clause incapable of granting protection to live performances as they cannot be "fixed" in some tangible medium at the
time of performance. 34 As a result, unlike traditional copyright
§ 59.1-41.2 (Michie 1999) (criminalizing unauthorized recordings of live concerts); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.25.030 (2000); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-50 (1999).
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The statutory language
is identical to 17 U.S.C. § 1101, except for the potential for prison and seizure and
destruction of any such copies upon conviction. See id.
31. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8E.01[C], at 8E-7 (1999) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYrMGHT] (asserting that
"support under the Copyright Clause for this amendment . . . must be discounted"); Goodwin, supra note 4, at 357-58 (discussing federal anti-bootiegging
statute's constitutional deficiency as opposed to traditional copyright protection
laws); Patterson, supra note 3, at 409 (commenting that "[t]echnically, the . ..
[anti-bootlegging] statute cannot classify live performances as copyrightable works,
given that musical artists never officially fix their performances in a phonorecord
as required by the Copyright Act"); Lionel S. Sobel, Bootleggers Beware Copyright Law
Now Protects Live Musical Performances But New Law Leaves Many Questions Unanswered, 17 No. 2 ENT.L. REP. 6, 11 (1995) (stating that "[s]ince Congress only has
the power to protect fixed works under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the
[c]onstitutional basis for Congress' power to enact the bootlegging law must be
some other provision of the Constitution."). For further discussion of the Commerce Clause's support of statutes related to interstate commerce, see infra notes
74-81 and accompanying text.
32. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
33. See Goldstein, 421 U.S. at 561-62 (holding that sound recordings were physical renderings within scope of "Writings" clause); cf.CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315,
320 (1st Cir. 1967) (concluding that Copyright Clause "extend[ed] to any concrete, describable manifestation of intellectual creation..." and thereby implying
negation of tangible form requirement). A noted commentator dismissed this
statement as dictum as the court categorized the disputed works as "Writing" within
the Copyright Clause's scope. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31,
§ 1.08[C] [2], at 1-66.30 n.35. For a discussion of the elements needed to uphold
copyright protection, see infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
34. See 3 NIMMER ON CoPWGHT,supra note 31, § 8E.02, at 8E-11 (stating that
"[g]iven the limitation of federal statutory copyright to '[W]ritings' by virtue of its
constitutional authorization, it has long been thought outside the domain of Congress to accord protection to such unfixed productions."); Deas, supra note 3, at
578 (questioning use of Copyright Clause as constitutional basis for federal antibootlegging clause); Goodwin, supra note 4, at 359 (commenting on federal anti-
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laws, the federal anti-bootlegging statute derives authority from an35
other constitutional source.
A.

General Background

In the past, federal law protected against the counterfeiting,
pirating and bootlegging of some types of sound recordings.3 6 Not
until 1994 did Congress enact protection for live performances. 37
Congress enacted the anti-bootlegging statute to comply with the
International Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property ("TRIPs") .3 8 The United States' participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), an international
trade agreement, paved the way for establishment of TRIPs. 39 With
congressional revisions of the federal copyright protection statutes
in 1976, 1982 and 1992, the statutes remain a potent weapon in the
recording industry's war against music piracy. 40
bootlegging statute's constitutional grounds). Before federal protection, states
have traditionally granted copyright protection to live performances. For further
discussion of this state protection, see supra note 29.
35. See David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1385, 1410
(1995) (commenting that "[t]he anti-bootlegging provision unquestionably violates Copyright Clause authority... ."); see also Deas, supra note 3, at 578 (stating
"short of... amending the Constitution... one must find another constitutional
mooring for [the federal anti-bootlegging statute] ... ."); Goodwin, supra note 4,
at 360 (asserting that Copyright Clause is not constitutional basis for anti-bootlegging statute); Sobel, supra note 31, at 11 (concluding "the Constitutional [sic] basis
for Congress' power to enact the bootlegging law must be some other provision of
the Constitution."). For a discussion of the alternative constitutional source for
anti-bootlegging statute, see infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of the protections afforded to sound recording, see supra
note 26 and accompanying text.
37. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1994) (criminalizing, among other actions, unsanctioned recordings of live performances). For further discussion of
copyright protection's statute history, see infra notes 41-73 and accompanying text.
38. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 8E.01 [B], at 8E-5 to 8E-6
(discussing international communities' pressure for congressional enactment of
this statute); Goodwin, supra note 4, at 350-51 (commenting that need for uniform
global intellectual property laws led to statute's enactment); Patterson, supra note
3, at 402-03 (noting inefficient prior international treaties and that growth of bootlegging led to Uruguay Round of GATT). Composed as a requiem for those who
bootleg and distribute live performances, the statute instead raised further constitutional discord. See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 355 (explaining that anti-bootlegging statute differs from other copyright statutes).
39. See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 350-51. GATT is a global trade agreement
designed to promote trade among participating countries. See id. This agreement
is constantly being revised, and during the eighth cycle of negotiations, called the
Uruguay Round, participating countries addressed the issue of international protection of intellectual property rights. See id. TRIPs was the result of that negotiation round, requiring that GATT countries provide copyright protection for
"sound recordings and the unauthorized fixation of live performances." Id. at
351.
40. See Patterson, supra note 3, at 385-86 (commenting on increased penalties
for violating copyright laws with each successive statute); Schwartz, supra note 4, at
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The first copyright statute, which was passed in 1790, offered
protection only to maps, charts and books. 4 1 This statute was later
expanded to protect "any person who shall invent and design, engrave, etch or work.., any historical or other print or prints ....
Musical notation qualified for protection in 1831, specifically granting the copyright holder the right to sell the musical composition
score. 4 3 "Typically, a copyright holder is the composition's author
or a music-publishing company." 44 The performer generally did
not hold the copyright unless the performer happened to be the
composer or acquired the copyright. 4 5 The statute protected written musical notation, but not the reproduction of actual sound, as
46
Edison had not yet invented the phonograph.
This distinction apparently confused the Supreme Court in
1908 in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.4 7 Piano rolls,
an early recording technology, are long scrolls of paper with holes
telling a "player piano" what notes to play. 48 With the piano roll, a
person did not need the sheet music to appreciate the composition. 49 Under the Act of 1831, the Court did not find the audible
reproduction of the musical composition via piano rolls to be a musical notation. 50 Based on this interpretation, any mechanism that

629-30 (noting that penalties for record piracy increased with passage of each
statute).
41. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 n.17 (1973) (discussing historical evolution of copyright statutes in considering constitutional challenge to
state statute) (citing Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124).
42. Id. (quoting Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171).
43. See id. (citing Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870));
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 624 (noting exclusive right of copyright holder to disburse protected work).
44. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 624.
45. See id. (discussing when performer could obtain copyright to musical
score).
46. See id. (noting that until Edison invented phonograph, there was little
need to protect sound reproduction).
471. 209 U.S. I (1908) (holding pianoro l. ,vere.not entitled to coprght protection, as they were not "copies" within meaning of Copyright Act); Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 624 (discussing Supreme Court's confusion between "reproduction
of actual sound" and "reproduction of written musical notation").
48. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 624 n.69 (defining "piano rolls").
49. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 564-65 (commenting on implications of piano
roll technology as noted by 1907 Congressional report).
50. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18 (holding, "[w]e cannot think that they are
copies within the meaning of the copyright act .... [A]s the act of Congress now
stands we believe it does not include these [piano rolls] as copies or publications
of the copyrighted music involved in these cases.").
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reproduced the composition's actual notes, rather than the written
51
musical notation, could avoid copyright infringement claims.
In 1909, partly in response to the White-Smith decision, Congress revised and consolidated all federal copyright statutes. 52 Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1909, allowing the copyright
holder to "select the first person to preserve or 'fix' the work on a
record or musical roll." 53 As long as a royalty was paid to the origi-

nal copyright holder, later performers could record their own versions of the copyrighted work. 5 4 The Act left unclear whether a
party, without recording his or her own version, could reproduce
the original performance as long as the royalty was paid. 5 5 The
Sound Recording Act of 1971 erased all uncertainties by granting
federal copyright protection to the reproduction of performances
in the form of actual sound recordings, assuming the performances
were previously copyrighted, but it left unanswered the legality of
recording live concert performances. 56 Twenty-three years later,
Congress addressed the live concert bootlegging issue but raised
several constitutional concerns.

B.

57

Traditional Elements of the Copyright Clause

Traditionally, Congress derived authority to enact copyright
laws from the Constitution's Copyright Clause. 58 The basic, neces51. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 624 (alluding to impact of Court's holding
regarding devices that can duplicate musical compositions' notes).
52. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 562 n.17 (stating that "[C]ongress agreed to a
major consolidation and amendment of all federal copyright statutes"); Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 625 (observing Congress' revision of copyright statutes in reaction
to White-Smith holding).
53. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 625.
54. See id. (offering example that if musician A wished to record song for
which B held copyright and B had already selected C as "the first person to preserve .

.

. the work," then A must pay royalty to B).

55. See Patterson, supranote 3, at 382 (asserting that it was unclear "whether a
third party could legally reproduce the copyright holder's original performance by
paying the relatively inexpensive compulsory license fee rather than record his or
her own performance.") (citations omitted); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 625 (quoting scholarly commentator who "believed that a third party could indeed copy the
original work by paying the compulsory license fee ... .") (citing Melville B. Nimmer, Photocopyingand Record Piracy: Of Dred Scott and Alice in Wonderland, 22 UCLA
L. REv. 1052, 1060 (1975)).
56. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (superseded by Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994)).
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994). For a discussion of alternative constitutional
sources for a statute, see infra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
58. See U.S. CONST. art, I, § 8, cl. 8. The Copyright Clause states Congress may
"promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries[.]" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. To achieve this goal, Congress
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sary element for federal copyright protection is that the work must
have an "Author" and must be a "Writing."59 Since the Constitution's passage, technological advances have forced courts to reinterpret continually the Copyright Clause, particularly the "Writing"
requirement. 60 In Schaab v. Kleindienst,6 1 the court noted significant technological advances since the formation of the Copyright
Clause and found that the Clause "must be interpreted broadly" for
continued effectiveness. 62 In upholding the constitutionality of a
statute intended to protect sound recordings from music piracy,
Schaab set the stage for the Supreme Court's Copyright Clause in63
terpretation in Goldstein v. California.
There are two basic prerequisites to fulfill the "Writing" clause:
intellectual labor and tangible form/fixation. 64 Inherent in the
tangible form concept, which is the focus of Moghadam, is the regrants authors "exclusive right to the fruits of their respective works." Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973). This right allows the author to prevent any
unauthorized copying of the work for commercial purposes. See id.
59. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 1.08[A], at 1-66.25 (asserting, "Only works that qualify as writing may claim the protection of federal copyright legislation") (footnote omitted). This section focuses on the meaning
behind "Writings," specifically whether a live, unrecorded concert can be considered a "Writing" at the time of performance. For further discussion of the elements of a "Writing," see infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
60. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (stating that "[the 'Writing' term has] not
been construed in [its] narrow literal sense, but, rather, with the reach necessary
to reflect the broad scope of constitutional principles."); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (granting copyright protection to
photographs and noting photography was nonexistent when Copyright Act of 1802
was passed); Reiss v. Nat'l Quotation Bureau, 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (concluding that "if our Constitution embalms inflexibly the habits of 1789 [the scope
of copyright may be limited] .... But it does not; its grants of power to Congress
comprise, not only what was then known, but what the ingenuity of men should
devise thereafter."); 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 1.08[C] [2] to [F], at
1-66.30 to 1-66.38 (discussing various tangible forms that qualify as "[W]riting" including plays and musical compositions reduced to writing); Goodwin, supra note
4, at 358-59 (commenting that definition of "Writing" has expanded beyond strict,
literal sense).
61. 345 F. Supp. 589, 590-91, per curiam (D.D.C. 1972) (ruling against motion
for injunction protesting enforcement of Sound Recording Act of 1971).
62. See id. at 590. ("The copyright clause of the Constitution must be interpreted broadly to provide protection for this method [of sound recordings] of
fixing creative works in tangible form."). The companies that actually "fix" musical
performances into a tangible medium therefore fit both the authorship and "Writing" requirements of the copyright clause. See id. The Schaab court found for the
respondents, upholding the constitutionality of the Sound Recording Act. See id.
at 590-91.
63. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). For further discussion of Goldstein v. California,see
infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
64. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (commenting that "'[W]ritings'... may be
interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual
or aesthetic labor").
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quirement that the artistic work be "fixed" in some tangible medium. 65 While current interpretation of medium includes a variety
of media beyond traditional print, the definition remains consistent
in mandating that the work be fixed in some discernible, corporeal
format. 66 Unless the work of art can be reduced to this tangible
medium, it remains "unfixed" and not subject to copyright protection. 6 7 Eventually, courts agreed that a sound recording is a "Writ65. See id. at 562 (interpreting "Writing" to include any physical manifestation
of creative thought); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58
(1884) (holding that photographs are form of "Writing"); The Trade-Mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (qualifying "Writing" as including only original designs derived from creative and intellectual labor).
66. See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 358 (discussing consistency among traditional judicial and legislative interpretation of "Writing"). Examples of "fixed" media include phonographs, tapes and compact discs. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (6)-(7)
(1994) (stating broad categories of works granted copyright protection). This
broad interpretation of "Writing," and by implication "fixation," was not a recent
development. See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 358 (asserting that "the word
'[W] ritings' has 'always been construed to mean something that is tangible .... '")
(quoting Lionel S. Sobel, Bootleggers Beware: Copyright Law Now Protects Live Musical
Performances,But New Law Leaves Many Questions Unanswered, 17 No. 2 ENT.L. REP.
6, 11 (1995)).
In 1884, the Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, granted
Copyright Clause protection to the works of photographers. 111 U.S. 53, 58
(1884) (holding, "We entertain no doubt that the Constitution is broad enough to
cover an act authorizing copyright of photographs, so far as they are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author."). This case concerned a
suit filed by Sarony, a photographer, against Burrow-Giles, a lithography company,
for infringement of a Sarony photograph. See id. at 54. Burrow-Giles contested the
constitutionality of a statute granting photographs copyright protection, specifically asserting that a photograph was not an original work of art, but a mere reproduction of some feature. See id. at 56. The Court, analyzing the past legislative
history of the Copyright Clause, analogized photographs with "maps, charts, designs, engravings, etchings, cuts, and other prints" and could not find a reason to
excise photographs from the melange of other artistic works granted copyright
protection. Id. at 57-58. As long as some original facet of the photograph was
discernible, the Court concluded that copyright protection must be granted. See
id. at 60. This case expanded the definition of "Writings" to include "all forms of
writing... by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression." See Sarony, 111 U.S. at 58. Note that the photograph was a portrait of Oscar
Wilde, and the Court left unanswered whether "ordinary" photographs warranted
copyright protection. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 1.08[B], at 166.26 n.13.
67. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561-62 (declaring that "physical rendering of the
fruits of creative ...labor" was "Writing" subject to copyright protection); 1 NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 1.08[C] [2], at 1-66.30 (noting that writing "to
be given any meaning whatsoever, it must, at the very least, denote 'some material
form, capable of identification and having a more or less permanent endurance.'") (quoting Canadian Admiral Corp. v. Rediffusion, Inc., Can. Exch. 382,
383 (1954)); cf CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 1967) (implying negation of tangible form requirement by holding "Writing" to include "any concrete,
describable manifestation of intellectual creation"). For a refutation of the DeCosta
implication, see supra note 33.
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ing" entitled to Copyright Clause protection. 6 8 Congress implicitly
expanded the scope of "Writing" to include, among other things,
69
motion pictures, sound recordings and choreographic works.
The Supreme Court considered whether musical concert recordings fell under the auspices of the Copyright Clause in Goldstein
v. California.70 In Goldstein, the petitioners illegally copied and distributed for sale audiotapes of popular musical performances. 7 ' In

examining the "Writing" concept, the Court concluded that, "although the word '[W]riting' might be limited to script or printed
material, it may be interpreted to include any physical rendering of
the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor. ' 72 "Fixation,"
therefore, results when the "Writing" is reduced to the physical
medium.

C.

v3

The Commerce Clause: An Alternative Constitutional Source

If the Copyright Clause fails to support constitutionally a statute, other constitutional clauses may support that statute, particularly the Commerce Clause.7 4 In considering whether copyright
68. See Schaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589, 590 (D.D.C. 1972) (noting
that as technical advances form basis of sound recording industry, broad interpretation of Copyright Clause is required).
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (noting eight categories of authorship
granted copyright protection).
70. 412 U.S. 546, 562 (1973).
71. See id. at 549-50 (discussing petitioners' piracy operation, noting that petitioners would purchase single authorized recording, illegally duplicate it and distribute copies to retail outlets for public consumption).
72. Id. at 561 (citations omitted); see also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note
31, § 1.08[C] [2], at 1-66.30 n.34 (citing past cases interpreting "Writing" as requiring some tangible form).
73. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (noting that "Writing" encompasses physical
manifestations of intellectual labor); see also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note
31, § 1.08[C] [2], at 1-66.31 n.38 (asserting that fixation results under Copyright
Act when work is embodied in relatively permanent physical medium). Nimmer
continues, quoting legislative discussion stressing the need for a further qualification of the fixation concept given the transient nature of such display and storage
technologies as televisions and computers. See id. (citing H.R. 2237, 89th Cong.,
(2d Sess. 1966)).
74. For a discussion of the Commerce Clause and relevant case law, see infra
notes 82-111 and accompanying text.
Mere failure by Congress to cite a constitutional clause as authoritative support for a statute does not necessarily invalidate that statute. See Woods v. Cloyd W.
Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (stating "[t]he question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it
undertakes to exercise."). Woods sustained continued rent control provisions enacted during World War II, under the War Powers Act, despite the war's end. See
id at 142 (concluding that acts enacted under war power " [do] not necessarily end
with the cessation of hostilities"); cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565-66
(1995) (invalidating statute prohibiting gun possession in school zones despite ex-
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statutes fall within Commerce Clause authority, the scope of that
clause must be examined under the leading case of United States v.
Lopez. 75 In Lopez, the Court considered whether Congress exceeded
its Commerce Clause constitutional limits in enacting the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 ("Gun-Free Act") .76 The Gun-Free Act
made it a federal crime to possess a gun within a school zone. 77
The respondent contested his conviction, asserting that the GunFree Act was unconstitutional legislation under the Commerce
Clause. 78 The Supreme Court agreed, ruling that the activity of carrying a gun did not substantially affect interstate commerce. 79 In so
ruling, the Court established three categories of activities under
which Congress may regulate interstate commerce. 80 Generally, if a
plicit congressional invocation of Commerce Clause as constitutional support); Ry.
Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 473 (1982) (declining to use
Commerce Clause to uphold statute which violated Bankruptcy Clause).
75. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
76. See id. at 566 (discussing whether statute banning gun possession in school
zones exceeded Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce).
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2) (A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) ("It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm . . .[in] a school zone."). A
school zone is "in ...or within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a...
school." Id. § 921(a) (25).
78. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (noting that "[o]n appeal, respondent challenged his conviction based on his claim that § 9 22(q) exceeded Congress' power
to legislate under the Commerce Clause.").
79. See id. at 567-68 (holding Gun-Free Act failed test of whether regulated
activity substantially affected interstate commerce). Specifically, the Court focused
on the nature of the underlying activity. See 1 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 5-4 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that Court in Lopez wanted "to focus
more attention on the nature of the underlyingactivity - paying particular attention to
whether or not that activity could itself be described as part of an economic enterprise.") (emphasis in original). The statute would be sustained if the regulated
activity was commercial or economic in nature and substantially affected interstate
commerce. See id. (suggesting that statute meeting Lopez criteria would pass constitutional scrutiny).
80. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (identifying three categories of activities that
Congress may regulate under Commerce Power).
The first category of activities that Congress may regulate are those affecting
"channels of interstate commerce." Id. at 558 (citations omitted). Channels of
commerce may be analogized to a "river of commerce" that Congress controls by
excluding any good deemed unfit. See TRIBE, supra note 79, § 5-5. Second, Congress may "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. (citations omitted). Finally, Congress may regulate "activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted). Specifically, the third
category requires that the activity "substantially affect" interstate commerce. See id.
at 559 (noting unclear prior case law in determining necessary legal factors for
constitutional analysis of regulated activities); TRIBE, supra note 79, § 5-5 (stating
that "the 'substantial effects' requirement applies only to the third category; the
first two categories, by definition, substantially affect - because they are components of
- interstate commerce.") (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Robertson,
514 U.S. 669 (1995)).
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statute relates to interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause provides sufficient constitutional authority.8 1
D.

Congressional Intent and the Commerce Clause

Legislative findings assist courts in determining the congressional intent of a statute. 82 In United States v. Viscome,8 3 the Eleventh
Circuit granted substantial deference to congressional findings in
determining whether a statute met the Lopez criteria.8 4 In Viscome,
Noting that Lopez merely imposed "outer limits" to Congress' Commerce
Clause regulatory authority, the United States v. Wright court determined a statute's
constitutionality by considering whether a rational basis existed for concluding
that a regulated activity "substantially affected interstate commerce." 117 F.3d
1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 1997), vacated in part on other grounds, 133 F.3d 1412 (11th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 894 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
557 (1995)) (discussing standard under which statute will survive constitutional
scrutiny). Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) makes it a federal crime for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994). Wright concerned a
constitutional challenge to Congress criminalizing the possession of machine guns.
See Wright, 117 F.3d at 1267. Similar to Lopez, the respondent asserted that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause to regulate machine gun
possession. See id. at 1268-69. Specifically, Wright asserted that, similar to the statute at issue in Lopez, there was no justification for this statute under the Commerce
Clause because no legislative findings and no jurisdictional element existed
describing a connection between gun possession and interstate commerce. See id.
at 1268.
In denying respondent's claim, the court distinguished the statute in Wright,
which represented a total ban on the possession of machine guns, from the statute
in Lopez, which prohibited gun possession only within school zones. See id. at 1270
(disagreeing with Wright's argument and sustaining statute's constitutionality).
The court noted machine gun regulation qualified as an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce. See id. Finally, the Wright court found the statute had
a direct connection with interstate commerce, thereby finding sufficient Congressional authority to regulate machine gun possession. See id.
81. See TRIBE, supra note 79, § 5-4 (noting that "[i]n essence . .. the power to
regulate 'commerce' necessarily encompasses power ... over all activities that are
themselves part of the production or distribution of wealth in the broadest economic sense of that term ....

").

82. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (agreeing that while Congress need not make
"formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate
commerce," such findings "would enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate
commerce . . . ").

In Cheffer v. Reno, the court examined the constitutional validity of a statute
imposing civil and criminal penalties upon anyone threatening harm upon a person obtaining or providing reproductive health services. See 55 F.3d 1517, 1519
(1lth Cir. 1995). The Cheffer court sustained the constitutionality of the statute,
noting the legislative findings on record assisted the court in finding the regulated
activity has substantial impact upon interstate commerce. See id. at 1520 (noting
"extensive legislative findings support Congress' conclusion that the [statute at issue] regulates activity which substantially affects interstate commerce.").
83. 144 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 941 (1998).
84. See id. at 1371 (granting deference to explicit findings of Congress that
use of weapons of mass destruction substantially affected interstate commerce).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000

15

342

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 6
VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOuRNAL
[Vol. 7: p. 327

similar to Lopez, the respondent challenged the constitutionality of
the Commerce Clause-based statute imposing his conviction.8 5 In
upholding the statute's constitutionality, the Viscome court distinguished the Lopez holding, noting that, unlike Lopez, Congress made
findings about the regulated activity's impact upon interstate
8 6

commerce.

In addition to legislative findings, the existence of a jurisdictional element in a statute may assist a court in determining a stat-

The Viscome court's legislative deference derived from Turner BroadcastingSystem,
Inc. v. FCC. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (noting
that "[i ] n reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, 'courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress.'") (quoting Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 665).
Turner challenged the constitutionality of a provision requiring television
cable operators to carry local broadcast television stations. See id. at 185. In upholding the provision's constitutionality, the Court relied heavily upon congressional findings. See id. at 195 (concluding that Court's "sole obligation is 'to assure
that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences
based on substantial evidence.'") (quoting TurnerBroad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 666).
This deference was owed to the legislature's greater capacity to assimilate and evaluate data concerning legislative issues. See id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512
U.S. at 665-66) (citations omitted).
85. See Viscome, 144 F.3d at 1370. Gentile, a Viscome defendant, was convicted
of violating a statute making it a criminal offense for anyone to use weapons of
mass destruction. See id. Gentile was convicted of violating Title 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332a(a) (2), which states: "A person who uses, or attempts or conspires to use, a
weapon of mass destruction ... against any person within the United States ...
shall be imprisoned .

. . ."

See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a) (2) (1994)). Con-

gress later amended the statute to include an element requiring the government
to show that "the results of such use affect ... or would have affected interstate or
foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a) (2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Viscome, 144
F.3d at 1370 (noting in April 1996, Congress amended 1994 statute to include
interstate commerce element). Gentile asserted that because the unamended statute lacked the "interstate commerce" element, the conviction was invalid. See Vscome, 144 F.3d at 1370.
86. See Viscome, 144 F.3d at 1371 (commenting that "Congress finds that the
use... of weapons of mass destruction.., seriously affect[s] interstate and foreign
commerce .... ") (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-405, at 46 (1991)); Wright, 117
F.3d 1265, 1269 (rejecting argument that required "[C]ongress to place ajurisdictional element in every statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause .... ")
(citing United States v. Olin, 107 F.3d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1997)). Based upon
past congressional experience in regulating such weapons, the Viscome court
abided by the TurnerCourt's reasoning and granted substantial deference to Congress' findings. See Viscome, 144 F.3d at 1371 (stating that "[c]onsidering Congress'[ ] experience in regulating explosives and their effects, we accord these
findings substantial deference."). The Viscome court also noted that the statute in
question, unlike Lopez, completely regulated the activity and did not attempt to
decide case-by-case whether the facts supported an impact upon interstate commerce. See id. (noting that statute at issue in Lopez statute did not contain "interstate nexus" requirement ensuring case-by-case inquiry into whether firearm
possession affected interstate commerce).
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7

The absence of a jurisdictional
element forces courts to determine independently whether the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 88 Under
this analysis, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Olin§9 declined
to overturn the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") on constitutional grounds. 90
The court noted that even lacking that jurisdictional element, the
statute fell within the Lopez requirements. 9 1 Assuming that a statute
exceeds the constitutional limitations of one clause, the court must
determine whether Congress may pass that statute under a second
constitutional clause, if that statute meets the second clause's
92
requirements.
E.

Choosing One Constitutional Clause Over Another

The Supreme Court considered choosing one constitutional

93
clause over another in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States
when it declined to hold the public accommodation sections of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 unconstitutional, despite the fact that similar provisions were ruled unconstitutional under the Fourteenth

87. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (distinguishing prior case by noting that instant
statute had "no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to [activities] ...hav[ing] an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.").
88. See United States v. Olin, 107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding
that missing jurisdictional element forced courts to determine independently
whether statute substantially affected interstate commerce). Olin, a chemical
plant operator, contaminated portions of the land around the plant. See id. at
1508. The federal government filed suit against Olin under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), and Olin
responded by challenging CERCLA's constitutionality on Commerce Clause
grounds. See id.
89. 107 F.3d 1506 (l1th Cir. 1997).
90. See id. at 1510 (noting that missing legislative findings or jurisdictional
element did not preclude constitutional soundness of contested legislation).
91. See id. (upholding constitutionality of CERCLA despite lack of legislative
findings and jurisdictional element). The Olin court found that despite the absence of !eislative findings and a jurisdictional element, CERCLA regulates activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. See id. at 1510 (stating "[CERCLA]
remain[ed] valid . . .because it regulate[d] a class of activities that substantially
affects interstate commerce."). Olin also noted that while CERCLA lacks formal
legislative findings, the Supreme Court had used such findings from antecedent
statutes. See id. at 1510 n.6.
92. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
For a discussion of the Heart of Atlanta Motel decision, see infra notes 94-96 and
accompanying text.
93. 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (sustaining constitutional validity of certain sections
of Civil Rights Act of 1964 despite similar provisions constitutionally overruled in
prior case).
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Amendment in the Civil Rights Cases.94 The Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel did so without directly overturning that earlier case. 95
Given the close parallel between the two sets of Civil Rights Acts
provisions in both cases, it appears that a statute invalid under one
constitutional clause may be valid under another. 96

94. See id. at 250-51 (noting similar civil rights provision were found constitutionally deficient in 1883). In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court found that
civil rights provisions enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1875 exceeded the Fourteenth Amendment's legislative bounds. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25
(1883) (asserting that no "authority for the passage of the law in question can be
found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution;
and no other ground of authority for its passage being suggested, it must . ..be
declared void .... ."). The Civil Rights Cases Court did not, as noted by the Heart of
Atlanta Motel Court, determine if the Commerce Clause could sustain those provisions. See Heart of Atlanta Mote4 379 U.S. at 251 (noting "the fact that certain kinds
of business may not in 1875 have been sufficiently involved in interstate commerce
to warrant bringing them within the ambit of the commerce power is not necessarily dispositive of the same question today.").
The Civil Rights Cases considered the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of
1875. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9. The Act forbade illegal racial discrimination against individuals exercising their right to use public accommodations. See id. at 9-10. Public accommodations included inns, public conveyances,
theaters and other places of public amusement. See id. at 9 (citing Civil Rights Act
of 1875, 18 Stat. 335). The Court declared the provisions unconstitutional because
they went beyond Congress' authority to regulate private conduct via the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 11 (concluding statute at issue violated Fourteenth
Amendment because "[ilt nullified and [made] void all State legislation, and State
action of every kind, which impair[ed] the privileges and immunities of
citizens. .. ").

95. See Heart of Atlanta Motel 379 U.S. at 250 (declining to overtum Civil Rights
Cases, considering that decision without precedential value for instant case). The
Court found sufficient constitutional authority for the statute under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 258 (noting, "the power of Congress to promote interstate
commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents ... which might
have had a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.").
96. See id. at 250-52 (stepping through analysis that sustained, under one
clause, the constitutionality of statute similar to statute held unconstitutional
under different clause). The Civil Rights Cases Court could not apply the modem
Commerce Clause analysis. See id. at 251 (noting overly broad nature of 1875 Act
in Civil Rights Cases, which affected businesses that may not have engaged in interstate commerce, given state of transportation technology in nineteenth century).
With nine decades of technological achievement, the Court noted that businesses
formerly unaffected by the 1875 Act may now be subject to the 1964 Act. See Heart
of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 251 (stating that, at that time, nineteenth century businesses "may not have been sufficiently involved in interstate commerce"). Given
that (a) the Civil Rights Cases Court did not fully apply the Commerce Clause analysis to the 1875 Act and (b) the Heart of Atlanta Court declined to consider whether
the 1964 Act is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, there still remains an implicit assumption that legislation breaking constitutional boundaries
under one clause "has no bearing on whether it can be sustained under another
[clause]." United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
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The Trade-Mark [sic] Cases9 7 applied this analysis in resolving a
trademark protection statute's constitutionality. 98 The statute protected trademarks from, among other things, counterfeiting. 9 9 The
defendants contested their convictions, arguing that there was no
legislative authority to enact the statute.10 0 The government responded by asserting the Copyright Clause, or in the alternative, by
stating that the Commerce Clause provided sufficient authority for
statutory passage.' 0 1 The Court held it could not sustain the trademark statute under either the Copyright Clause or the Commerce
Clause, thus recognizing the possibility of alternative constitutional
10 2
support for a statute.
Almost a century later, the Second Circuit applied this analysis
in its determination of a copyright statute's constitutionality in Au97. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
98. See id. at 93-95 (considering whether statute derived its constitutional authority from Copyright Clause or Commerce Clause). The government asserted
that either the Copyright or Commerce Clause could sustain the statute's constitutionality. See id. at 93.
99. See Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141 (granting protection to
trademarks against counterfeiting). Specifically, the defendants were convicted of,
among other things, forging trademarks belonging to foreign and domestic manufacturers of liquor. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 82-83. The imitation
trademarks were used to delude customers as to the actual origin of champagne or
whiskey sold by defendants. See id.
100. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 91-92 (inquiring whether trademark
statute derived from constitutionally granted authority).
101. See id. at 86-87 (specifying government's two pronged argument in justifying enactment of trademark protection statute). While appellant failed with this
argument here, it presaged the one used in Moghadam. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at
1271 (discussing government's argument which closely paralleled that from TradeMarks Cases).
102. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 98-99 (holding that trademarks lack
elements necessary to grant Copyright Clause protection). Trademarks, unlike
copyrights, do not promote the sciences or the arts; thus, under the 1876 Act,
originality was not necessary to register a trademark. See id. at 93-94.
The Court declined to analyze the statute's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, claiming that the statute regulated "commerce wholly between citizcs f hcsameSe,
tmho
s1
-,L,. s
.J. .a power not confided to Congress."
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 96-97; TRiBE, supra note 79, § 5-4 (noting statute
did not qualify for Commerce Clause support, so Court felt no need to define
congressional limits of power under Commerce Clause). Tribe concluded that
"[tihe Trade-Mark Cases are notable . .. because of [the Court's] expressed reluctance to find that Congress was attempting to exercise its commerce power inasmuch as Congress had not said it was making such attempt." Id. (emphasis in
original). The lack of a jurisdictional element that would qualify the statute for
Commerce Clause protection was not conducive in the Court's analysis. See The
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 97 ("Here is no requirement that such person [involved in trademark activity protected by the statute] shall be engaged in the kind
of commerce which Congress is authorized to regulate.").
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thors League of America, Inc. v. Oman.10 3 The plaintiff asserted, inter
alia, that the statute could not derive its constitutional authority
from the Copyright Clause. 10 4 The court rejected the plaintiffs
constitutional attack, concluding that while the statute may exceed
Congress' Copyright Clause power, other sources of congressional
power justified the statute's enactment. 10 5 This line of cases,
namely Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Trade-Mark Cases and Authors
League, hold that one clause may constitutionally support a statute
10 6
that fails under the other clause's scrutiny.
These cases, however, contradict the Supreme Court's holding
in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons ('Railway"). 107 The statute at issue in Railway conflicted with the Bankruptcy Clause's uniformity provision.' 0 8 The Court declined to find the statute
103. 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986). The statute at issue, which has now lapsed,
protected the domestic book publishing and printing industries by restricting "importation of copyrighted, foreign-manufactured, non-dramatic, literary works." Id.
at 221.
104. See id. at 221 (stating plaintiffs constitutional arguments against clause
based upon First and Fifth Amendments). The plaintiffs argued that the statute
interfered with the Copyright Clause's purpose which was to promote the progress
of useful arts. See id. at 224.
105. See id. (commenting that plaintiff failed to realize that Copyright Clause
was not only constitutional source of congressional power). The court noted that
the statute, regulating imports of foreign works, could derive authority from the
Commerce Clause. See Authors League of America, 790 F.2d at 224 ("[D]enial of
copyright protection . . . is clearly justified as an exercise of the legislature's power
to regulate commerce . .

").

106. For a further examination of this line of cases, see supra notes 93-105 and
accompanying text.
107. 455 U.S 457, 471 (1982) (asserting that if statute were upheld, Bankruptcy Clause's uniformity provision would become meaningless). In 1975, the
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. ("Rock Island"), received district
court permission for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act. See id. at 459.
Rock Island continued to operate under the Act until September 1979, when Rock
Island ceased operation due to a labor strike. See id. Consequently, the District
Court ordered asset liquidation. See id In June 1980, the court ordered that former employees could not make any claims upon the liquidation proceeds. See id.
at 460. Congress, six days prior, however, enacted a statute ordering the railroad
to pay $75 million to former employees. See Ry. LaborExecutives' Ass'n, 455 U.S. at
461-62 (noting congressional passage of Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act ("RITA"), providing economic and employment assistance to
former employees). The Act ordered that those former employees who were still
unemployed be paid $75 million. See 45 U.S.C. § 1008 (repealed 1983); Ry. Labor
Executives'Ass'n, 455 U.S. at 462 n.3 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 1008).
108. See Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 455 U.S. at 469 (noting that bankruptcy
laws must be uniform throughout United States). The Bankruptcy Clause's uniformity provision requires any congressional statute to apply equally among classes
of debtors, otherwise discrimination among debtors and creditors would result. See
id. (noting also that clause prohibits Congress "from treating railroad bankruptcies
as a distinctive problem"); TRIBE, supra note 79, § 5-8 (noting congressional bankruptcy statute cannot apply to one debtor or discriminate among regional debtors
and creditors). The District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, holding
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constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 10 9 In so ruling, the
Court noted that use of the Commerce Clause as an alternative constitutional source for a statute "would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of the Congress to enact bankruptcy
laws." 110 This case, while limited to bankruptcy law, exemplifies
how a court may decline to sustain constitutionally a statute under
an alternative clause when that statute fails initial constitutional
scrutiny."'
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

A copyright statute's legality must hew to past judicial interpretation of the Copyright Clause or otherwise fall before a constitutional challenge. 112 If the anti-bootlegging statute, relying upon
the Copyright Clause, fails to comport with past judicial interpretation of the clause, then the statute must look elsewhere to find constitutional redemption. 1 13 In United States v. Moghadam, the
respondent asserted that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority by enacting the anti-bootlegging statute. 114 The government countered, claiming that either the Copyright Clause or the
RITA constitutionally unacceptable. See Ry. LaborExecutives'Ass'n, 455 U.S. at 46465 (citations omitted).
109. See Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 455 U.S. at 471 ("The language of the
Bankruptcy Clause itself compels us to hold that such a bankruptcy law is not
within the power of Congress to enact."). To sustain this statute, the Court held,
would enable discriminatory private bills that could favor some individual debtors
over others. See id.
110. Id. at 469 (exploring history behind Bankruptcy Clause's uniformity
clause and concluding that individualized nature of RITA bars judicial approval).
Further, the Court noted that "if we were to hold that Congress had the power to
enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would
eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to enact
bankruptcy laws." See id. at 468-69.
111. For a discussion of the significance of Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, gee
infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
112. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (noting respondent's challenge to antibootlegging statute's constitutionality on grounds that it exceeded Congress' authority to regulate copyrights).
113. SPP id. at 1273 ("This positive grant of legislative authority [of the Copyright Clause to protect works] includes several limitations."); Deas, supra note 3, at
578 (asserting that as statute is outside purview of Copyright Clause, another "constitutional mooring" must be found); Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1411 (concluding
statute "must not be rooted in the Copyright Clause"); Sobel, supra note 31, at 1112 ("[A]nother Constitutional basis for [the anti-bootlegging statute] must be
found."); Goodwin, supra note 4, at 357-58 (asserting that anti-bootlegging statute
cannot derive constitutional authority from Copyright Clause).
114. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271-73. Some of the enumerated powers
granted to Congress include the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce
("Commerce Clause") and the granting of patents and copyrights ("Copyright
Clause"). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Commerce Clause provided sufficient constitutional authority for
enactment of the federal anti-bootlegging statute. 1 5 With the motion to dismiss denied by the district court, Moghadam reasserted
this argument before the Eleventh Circuit.1 16 The Eleventh Circuit
upheld the conviction, affirming the district court's dismissal of
11 7
Moghadam's constitutional challenge.
In so ruling, the court distinguished between two lines of cases
that conflicted regarding whether Congress may use one clause to
enact a statute barred by another clause.11 8 The court found that
Congress could use other constitutional clauses, such as the Commerce Clause, to grant "copyright-like" protection to works that
might not meet the full requirements of the Copyright Clause. 1 19
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Commerce Clause pro120
vides sufficient authority for the federal anti-bootlegging statute.
The Moghadam court first considered the federal anti-bootlegging statute's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. 12 1 The
court then ascertained whether Congress could pass a law under
the Commerce Clause to avoid obstacles raised by the Copyright
Clause. 122 The Moghadam court concluded by resolving the statute's constitutionality under the Copyright and Commerce
115. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (summarizing government's argument
that statute is valid under one of two constitutional clauses).
116. See id. (stating procedural basis for Moghadam's appearance before Eleventh Circuit).
117. See id. (rejecting Moghadam's appeal of district court's motion to dismiss
indictment).
118. See id. at 1279-80 (recognizing "tension" between two lines of cases, with
one line asserting that, where Copyright Clause might bar statute, Commerce
Clause may be used to uphold that statute and other line contesting that assertion). For further discussion of this conflict of case law, see infra notes 121-25 and
accompanying text.
119. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (1999) (stating, "We
hold that the Copyright Clause does not envision that Congress is positively forbidden from extending copyright-like protection under other constitutional clauses,
such as the Commerce Clause, to works of authorship that may not meet the fixation requirement inherent in the term 'Writings.'").
120. See id. at 1282 (summing up reasons for upholding anti-bootlegging statute's constitutionality and Moghadam's conviction). For further discussion of the
Eleventh Circuit's methodology, see infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
121. See id. at 1280 (noting that in this instance, use of Commerce Clause was
acceptable because Copyright Clause could not affirm anti-bootlegging statute's
constitutionality). For further discussion of the court's Commerce Clause analysis,
see infra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
122. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1282 (holding anti-bootlegging statute met
Commerce Clause Lopez requirements). The court assumed arguendo that the
Commerce Clause could not be used to avoid a Copyright Clause restriction,
where the restriction conflicts with a particular Commerce Clause facet. See id. at
1280 n.12. For further discussion of the court's analysis in Moghadam, see infra
notes at 152-58 and accompanying text.
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Clauses.1 23 The bulk of the court's analysis laid in determining
when Congress may constitutionally validate a statute under one
clause to avoid the restrictions of another clause that would preclude validity. 124 As this was an issue of first impression, the Elev125
enth Circuit looked to analysis from analogous past cases.
A.

The Copyright Clause May Not Constitutionally Sustain the
Anti-Bootlegging Statute

The Eleventh Circuit began by analyzing the anti-bootlegging
statute's constitutionality under the Copyright Clause.1 26 The court
noted that past congressional and judiciary interpretations imposed
several restrictions upon the clause. 127 Given those limitations, the
court considered whether the Copyright Clause could be a constitu128
tional source of the anti-bootlegging statute.
The Supreme Court indirectly addressed the issue of whether a
sound recording, but not a bootleg, was entitled to copyright protection in Goldstein v. California.129 The Court sustained a state statute granting copyright protection to sound recordings. 130 If the
anti-bootlegging statute, protecting live performances from unauthorized recordings, derived authority from the Copyright Clause,
but failed to meet the clause's elements, then Moghadam's convic3
tion was unconstitutional.' '
The Moghadam court therefore examined the issue of whether
a live musical performance qualifies as a "Writing." 132 Noting that
123. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1273-76 (analyzing anti-bootlegging statute's
constitutionality under Copyright and Commerce Clauses).
124. See id. at 1277-81 (discussing whether Congress may use Commerce
Clause power to avoid Copyright Clause restrictions).
125. See id. at 1271 ("The constitutionality of the anti-bootlegging statute appears to be a question of first impression in the nation.").
126. See id. at 1273 ("Our analysis of the constitutionality of [the anti-bootlegging statute] begins with the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution.").
127. See id. at 1273-74 (discussing inherent aspects of Copyright Clause, including concepts of "Writing," fixation and tangible form).
128. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1273-74 (noting that Moghadam's argument
was based upon pastjudicial interpretation of Copyright Clause).
129. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). For a discussion of
the Goldstein holding, see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
130. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 560 (concluding "the language of the Constitution neither explicitly precludes the States from granting copyrights nor grants
such authority exclusively to the Federal government.").
131. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (noting Moghadam's motion to dismiss
indictment on grounds that anti-bootlegging statute was unconstitutional under
Copyright Clause).
132. See id. at 1274 (discussing Moghadam's argument that live performance
was not fixed in some tangible medium at time of performance).
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fixation is among the Copyright Clause's limitations, Moghadam asserted that, as the anti-bootlegging statute failed to abide by that
concept, the statute was void.' 33 No cases have held directly that
every "Writing" must be "fixed" in a tangible form in order to ob34
tain copyright protection, though it had been strongly suggested.1
Every successive statutory revision of the copyright laws has required some form of "fixation" for the work to qualify for copyright
protection. 13 5 Over a century ago, the court in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony noted such a fixation. 136 More recently, the
Court in Goldstein interpreted "Writing" to encompass "any physical
rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor,"
concluding that artistic performance recordings may fall under the
Copyright Clause's protections. 13 7 A year after Goldstein, a district
court agreed with that assessment, noting, "it is now clear, then,
that a writing may be perceptible either visually or aurally."13 8 Yet,
these holdings did not directly qualify live musical performances as
within the Copyright Clause's protective scope and the Moghadam
139
court declined to hold otherwise.
133. See id. at 1273 (commenting that Moghadam relied upon fixation concept as core of argument against constitutionality of anti-bootlegging statute).
134. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 1.08[C] [2], at 1-66.30 (asserting that no cases have directly held that for work to be "Writing" it must be in
some tangible form).
135. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 (noting that work must be reduced to
some physical rendering of Authors creativity and originality).
136. 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (holding photographs are protected by copyright as
long as some smidgen of originality exists). For a discussion of the Burrow-Giles
holding, see supra note 66.
137. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561-62 (noting sound recordings fall under that
definition).
138. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.08[B], at 1-66.27; see also Schaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589, 590 (D.D.C. 1972).
139. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 (declining to decide whether fixation
requirement included live performances). The court did not formally hold the
federal anti-bootlegging statute unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause. See
id. A noted copyright law commentator agreed with Moghadam's assertion that a
live performance is not in a tangible form at the time of performance. See
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 ("[N]o respectable interpretation of the word 'writings' embraces an untaped performance of someone singing at Carnegie Hall.")
(alteration in original) (quoting Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1409). "But for the
bootlegger's decision to record," Moghadam argued, "a live performance is fleeting and evanescent." Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274.
The Moghadam court also noted that the anti-bootlegging statute's lack of a
copyright time limit conflicts with the Copyright Clause's requirement that protection be extended only for "Limited Times." See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 n.9.
The court chose not to address this issue as Moghadam apparently did not preserve that argument. See id. At oral argument, the court apparently addressed this
issue extensively. See Appeals Court Backs Anti-Bootlegging Statute, 15 No. 3. ENr. L. &
FIN. 3, 3 (June 1999) (quoting Moghadam's counsel, David A. Nickerson, "This
[issue] was discussed a lot during oral arguments. The next case that comes along
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The Anti-Bootlegging Statute Harmonizes
With the Commerce Clause

With the anti-bootlegging statute lacking the "fixation" element, the Eleventh Circuit examined the Commerce Clause to determine if a more harmonious chord could be struck.1 40 The court
turned to the Lopez case to locate the standard for determining the
constitutional sufficiency necessary to sustain the federal anti-bootlegging statute. 14 1 Lopez identified three categories of activities that
142
Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause.
The Moghadam court concluded that the federal anti-bootlegging statute fell under the third category of "intrastate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce." 14 3 To qualify for the
third category, the court concluded that a rational basis must exist
to support the contention that the regulated activity substantially
affects interstate commerce. 4 4 A rational basis, supporting the relationship between the activity and interstate commerce, may be
found by examining legislative history and any statutory jurisdic145
tional elements.
is going to seize on [that "Limited Times" argument in arguing the anti-bootlegging statute unconstitutional]").
140. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 (applying Commerce Clause scrutiny in
determining anti-bootlegging statute's constitutionality).
141. See id. at 1275 (concluding Lopez is most appropriate case to apply to
instant facts).
142. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). For further discussion of the three categories which are appropriately regulated under the Commerce Clause, see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
143. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (stating, "our analysis here focuses on
the third category of appropriate legislation"). The Moghadam court noted the
"obviousness" of the link between bootleg compact discs and interstate commerce,
concluding that if bootlegging is done for financial gain, it affects commerce. See
id. at 1276. For a discussion of the interaction between bootlegging and commerce, see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
144. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. That rational basis must form an apparent
relationship demonstrating the regulated activity's impact upon interstate commerce. See United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 1997). For
further discussion of the rational basis, see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
145. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274-76 (discussing factors that would sustain
constitutionality under Commerce Clause). The Moghadam court deferred to the
Viscome court's finding granting substantial deference to legislative findings in evaluating whether the statute met Lopez criteria. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (noting that Wright commented that lack of legislative findings on record did not
negate constitutionality); United States v. Viscome, 144 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 941 (1998) (noting legislative findings important in upholding
constitutionality of statute). The court in Viscome, similar to Lopez, assessed a statute's constitutionality under which the appellee was convicted. See Viscome, 144
F.3d at 1370-71 (upholding statute's constitutionality noting that, unlike Lopez,
Congress made findings on impact of regulated activity upon interstate
commerce).
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The Moghadam court examined the federal anti-bootlegging
statute and found it lacked both substantive legislative history and
any jurisdictional element. 146 Despite the statute's failure to provide these two elements, the Moghadam court still found that bootleg compact discs substantially impact interstate commerce. 147 The
court relied upon Congress' underlying motive in enacting the antibootlegging statute. 148 Specifically, the statute was enacted to comply with an international treaty designed to secure uniform global
protection of intellectual property rights. 149 Given that context, the
court concluded that protection of interstate and international
trade was the impetus behind the anti-bootlegging statute and
therefore within the Commerce Clause scope. 150 Having resolved
that issue, the Moghadam court examined a more troublesome legal
question.15

1

The court inquired whether Congress could enact a statute
under one clause in order to avoid problems that arise under another clause. 152 Assuming a statute falls under the auspices of constitutional clause A, but not B, the court must resolve whether
Congress may pass a statute under B, avoiding clause A's constraints. 153 The Eleventh Circuit examined cases where a statute
was found constitutional under one clause despite another clause's
146. For further discussion of the federal anti-bootlegging statute's legislative
history, see infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
147. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 ("The link between bootleg compact
discs and interstate commerce and commerce with foreign nations is selfevident.").
148. See id. (concluding, "the very reason Congress prohibited [bootlegging]
is because of the deleterious economic effect on the recording industry"). For a
discussion of bootlegging's economic impact, see supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
149. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 (noting statute was passed to comply with
World Trade Organization obligations (in form of GATT legislation known as
TRIPs)). For further examination of the legislative impetus for passage of the antibootlegging statute, see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
150. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 (finding that, despite lack of specific
findings, Congressional intent was to regulate interstate commerce).
151. See id. at 1277 (beginning analysis of whether statute that violates one
constitutional clause, may pass scrutiny under another clause).
152. See id. ("The more difficult question in this case is whether Congress can
use its Commerce Clause power to avoid the limitation that might prevent it from
passing the same legislation under the Copyright Clause.").
153. See id. at 1277 (examining whether Congress can pass legislation under
one constitutional clause to avoid limitations of another clause). The Moghadam
court, in resolving this issue, assumes arguendo that the federal anti-bootlegging
statute, lacking the "fixation" requirement inherent in traditional copyright protection laws, could not derive its constitutional authority from the Copyright
Clause. See id.
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conflicts. 15 4 The court responded by examining the Heart of Atlanta

Motel holding as the leading case on the issue of alternative consti55

tutional construction. 1

A similar analysis was applied in the Trade-Mark Cases, concerning a trademark protection statute's constitutionality. 156 The TradeMark Cases Court declined to sustain the disputed statute under either clause, but the Moghadam court distinguished this case by noting it demonstrated that legislation could be found constitutional
under one clause and not the other, despite statutory conflicts with
the other clause. 15 7 Additionally, the statute at issue in the TradeMark Cases failed to meet the requirements of the nineteenth century interpretation of the Commerce Clause, whereas the anti-bootlegging clause met the more recent, twentieth century
15 8
interpretation of Commerce Clause requirements under Lopez.
More recently, the Second Circuit applied the Lopez analysis in
determining the constitutionality of a statute protecting the domestic publishing industry from foreign competition. 159 The Authors
League court resolved this issue, holding that even when the statute
exceeds Congress' power under the Copyright Clause, other
sources of congressional power justify the statute's enactment. 160
In other words, the Second Circuit's analysis confirmed the pro154. See id. at 1277-79 (noting cases, including Heart of Atlanta Motel and Authors League, exemplifying principle that constitutional clauses must be analyzed
independently of each other, thus granting legitimacy under one clause to statute
barred under another).
155. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1277-79 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel as clear
demonstration of issue). The Supreme Court, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, sustained
the constitutionality of the provisions at issue via the Commerce Clause, noting
that unlike the earlier case, the Civil Rights Act was clearly based on the Commerce Clause. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 25052 (sustaining provision under Commerce Clause, despite similar provision being
overturned on Fourteenth Amendment grounds in nineteenth century). For further discussion of the Heart of Atlanta Motel decision, see supra notes 94-96 and
accompanying text.
156. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1277 (citing Trade-Mark Cases as-case relevant
to instant facts). For discussion of the Trade-Mark Cases decision, see supra notes
98-102 and accompanying text.
157. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1278 (reasoning haLt .. ade-AM Cwun
stand for proposition that, even given conflicting constitutional clauses, legislation
may still be sustained).
158. See id. at 1278 (noting that Commerce Clause interpretation has changed
since Trade-Mark Cases decision).
159. See Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding statute constitutional under Commerce Clause, despite statute's nature).
For a discussion of the Authors League decision, see supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
160. See Authors League, 790 F.2d at 224 (noting that plaintiff failed to realize
Copyright Clause was not only constitutional source).
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position that the Commerce Clause may be used to sustain a stat6
ute's constitutionality despite other clauses' conflicts.' '
The Moghadam court also pointed to Railway Labor Executives'
162
Ass'n where the court declined to follow this line of reasoning.
Railway refused to sustain a statute conflicting with the Bankruptcy
Clause under a clause that did not conflict.' 63 In resolving the conflict between the two lines of cases, the Moghadam court took great
164
pains in narrowing its holding to the particular facts of the case.
The court found that the anti-bootlegging statute met the Lopez
Commerce Clause requirements.' 6 5 Additionally, the court also
found circumstances where, as noted in Railway, the Commerce
Clause cannot be used to support a statute that would fail constitutional muster under a different clause. 166 Given such findings, the
Moghadam court warned it would not sustain a statute under the
Commerce Clause if there were "fundamental inconsistencies" between the Commerce Clause use and the Copyright Clause
167
limitation.
The Moghadam court held that the Copyright Clause does not
forbid Congress from granting "copyright-like" protection under
other clauses, such as the Commerce Clause. 168 Unlike the Railway
case, the court concluded that imposing such protections raises no
conflicts between the two clauses. 169 Moreover, granting quasi-cop161. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279 ("The Authors League analysis suggests
that the Commerce Clause may be used to accomplish that which the Copyright
Clause may not allow.").
162. See id. (noting "tension" between analysis of Heart of Atlanta Motel, TradeMark Cases and Authors League and the analysis of Railway Labor Executives).
163. For further discussion of Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, see supra notes
107-11 and accompanying text.
164. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280 (declaring that "in resolving this tension.., we undertake a circumscribed analysis, deciding only what is necessary to
decide this case ....

").

165. See id. (noting that holding relied upon conclusion that anti-bootlegging
statute could be constitutionally justified by Commerce Clause). For a discussion
of the Lopez analysis of the Commerce Clause, see supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
166. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280 (asserting that underlying holding is notion that Commerce Clause may be used to support statute otherwise forbidden
under Copyright Clause).
167. See id. at 1280 n.12 (assuming that if statute's use of Commerce Clause
fundamentally conflicted with Copyright Clause restriction, Commerce Clause
could not be used to bypass that restriction).
168. See id. at 1280 (noting that while live performances lack fixation, they
certainly are entitled to some quasi-copyright protection).
169. See id. at 1281 ("Common sense does not indicate that extending copyright-like protection to a live performance [under the Commerce Clause] is fundamentally inconsistent with the Copyright Clause.").
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yright protection for "unfixed" live musical performances was in the
spirit of the Copyright Clause, even though it lacked the "fixation"
requirement. 170 The court noted that under the Sound Recording
Act of 1971 and its immediate progeny, musical artists could impose
copyright protection simply by simultaneously recording any live
performances. 17' Given that, the court concluded that the statute
did not violate copyright precepts but merely extended protection,
172
albeit via another clause.
V.

CRiTICAL ANALYSIS

The Moghadam court, faced with an issue of first impression,
orchestrated a sound analysis in determining the anti-bootlegging
statute's constitutionality. The court sustained the statute under
the Commerce Clause, declining to consider whether the constitu17 3
tionality of the statute under the Copyright Clause also rang true.
Additionally, with a close eye on the nation's commerce pulse, the
court avoided any sour notes by reconciling two conflicting lines of
Supreme Court cases.'

74

In some respects, the court was almost

175
forced to conduct itself the way it did.
The court avoided any conclusive Copyright Clause interpreta176
tion of the anti-bootlegging statute in its first prong of analysis.

Despite citing a plethora of authority questioning the statute's con170. See id. at 1280 ("[E]xtending such protection actually complements and
is in harmony with the existing scheme that Congress has set up under the Copyright Clause.").
171. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1281 (1999) (noting that
performer under prior law could protect live musical performances, bypassing
Copyright Clause's fixation requirement by simultaneously recording

performance).
172. See id. at 1282 (stating that anti-bootlegging statute satisfies Commerce
Clause requirements, avoiding affirmative ruling that statute lacked fundamental
Copyright Clause requirements).
173. See id. at 1272 (noting "what little legislative history exists tends to suggest that Congress viewed the [statute] as enacted pursuant to its Copyright Clause
authority") (citing 140 CONG. REc. H11441, H11457 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Hughes)). For a discussion of the court's Commerce Clause
analysis, see supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.

174. For further discussion of the court's recognition of bootlegging's economic impact and distinguishing of cases discussing use of one constitutional
clause over another to sustain a statute, see supra notes 152-72 and accompanying
text.

175. For a discussion of alternative holdings from the Moghadam decision, see
infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
176. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 (assuming, without affirmatively ruling,

that Copyright Clause's fixation requirement precluded constitutional support of
federal anti-bootlegging statute). For a discussion of the reasons behind the
court's assumption, see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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stitutional support, the court declined to rule that the Copyright
Clause's fixation requirement precluded support. 177 If the court
upheld the statute under the Copyright Clause, two centuries ofjudicial and legislative history maintaining fixation as an inherent
178
copyright element would be questioned.
The Moghadam court's second prong of analysis, holding the
statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause, also withstands
scrutiny, though not without criticism. 179 This court was the first to
sustain, under the Commerce Clause, copyright legislation exceeding the Copyright Clause's authority.18 0 The court had difficulty,
however, locating rational basis elements that would assist in determining substantial economic impact upon commerce. 8 1
The court asserted that no legislative findings discussing the
impact of live performance bootlegs upon interstate commerce exist.182 Such findings, however, do exist with respect to statutory
drafts of the anti-bootlegging statute. 183 During a debate on the
177. See id. at 1274 (citing scholarly comments discounting notion that Copyright Clause could grant constitutional support for federal anti-bootlegging statute); cf id. at 1281 (suggesting "fixation, as a constitutional concept, is something
less than a rigid, inflexible barrier to Congressional power").
178. For an historical overview of the fixation requirement, see supra notes
64-69 and accompanying text. But see CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967)
(holding that "in view of the federal policy of encouraging intellectual creation by
granting a limited monopoly at best, we think it sensible to say that the constitutional clause extends to any concrete, describable manifestation of intellectual creation [thereby excluding a tangible form requirement]").
179. For a discussion of the Moghadam court's second prong of analysis, see
supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
180. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 1.09, at 1-66.39 (asserting
that while several cases have mentioned possibility in dicta, no firm authority has
emerged); see also Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1410 (commenting "notwithstanding
that the anti-bootlegging provision unquestionably violates Copyright Clause authority, let us assume . .. it falls within Commerce Clause authority.").
181. For a discussion of the apparent lack of substantive rational basis elements, see supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. Rational basis elements
would support a finding of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. See id.
182. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 ("[T]here are no legislative findings in
the record regarding the effect of bootlegging of live musical performances on
interstate or foreign commerce.").
183. See Brown, supra note 4, at 47-55 (discussing proposed legislation that
paralleled language of finalized anti-bootlegging statute).
In early August, Congress introduced House Bill 4894 and Senate Bill 2368.
See id. at 47 (citing H.R. 4894, 103d Cong. § 102 (1994); S. 2368, 103d Cong. §§ 810 (1994)). The title of House Bill 4894 was the "Federal Anti-Bootleg Act of
1994" and contained language imposing civil liability upon those who trafficked in
bootleg sound recordings. See id. at 48 (citing H.R. 4894, 103d Cong. § 102
(1994)). The bill imposed liability upon those who copied, transmitted or distributed an unauthorized fixation of a live performance. See id. Interestingly, the bill
imposed liability upon unauthorized copying of music videos of live performances.
See id. Unlike the House Bill, the Senate Bill excluded liability from music videos
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bills held before a joint session of Congress, the RIAA asserted that
the proposed legislation, imposing criminal penalties for bootlegging, would help "curtail[ ] an illicit trade currently generating
8 4
about one billion dollars annually."'
Before Congress voted upon the statutory drafts, White Houseapproved legislation, similar in language to the proposed drafts,
was introduced in Congress on September 27, 1994.185 The House
Ways and Means Committee approved the White House version on
September 28, 1994, and the Senate Finance Committee approved
the same on September 29, 1994.186 Congress considered the legislation on November 29, 1994 after adjourning on October 7,
1994.187 The House passed the legislation that same day and the
Senate followed in early December, leaving scant room for any debate or legislative findings. 18 8 While the enacted statute contained
of live performances but added criminal penalties. See id. at 49 (citing S. 2368,
103d Cong. § 3(a) (1994) (formulating draft version of criminal penalties eventually codified with similar language as 18 U.S.C. § 2319A)). The remaining statutory language of the civil portion of the Senate Bill was similar to the House Bill.
See Brown, supra note 4, at 49.
184. GATT and Intellectual Property: Hearingson H.R 4894 and S. 2368 Before the
SenateJudiciary Comm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Subcomm. of
the Judiciary on Intellectual Property and JudicialAdministration, 103d Cong. (1994)
(statement of Jason Berman, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Recording
Industry Ass'n of America).
185. See Brown, supra note 4, at 51-52 (noting introduction of House Bill 5110
and Senate Bill 2467, both bills containing language similar to Senate Bill 2368).
House Bill 5110 included protection of music videos of live performances and kept
relatively the same language as the earlier House draft. See id. (citing H.R. 5110,
103d Cong. § 510 (1994)).
186. See Brown, supra note 4, at 54 (stating dates proposed legislation passed
in their respective committees). Perhaps Congress felt no need to debate given
that ajoint discussion on similar legislation was held a month earlier. For a discussion of this joint session of Congress, see supra note 184 and accompanying text.
187. See Brown, supra note 4, at 54 (commenting that procedural option was
exercised delaying for forty-five days House's vote to consider proposed legislation
which was originally scheduled for October 5, 1994).
188. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 8E.02, at 8E-6 to -7, nn.26 -

30 (noting scant legistlauve support justifying pasage of statute); Intellectual Proberty: GAT Bill Brings Major Reforms to Domestic IntellectualProperty Law, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) 7 (Dec. 5, 1994) (stating that House passed House Bill

5110 on November 29, 1994 and Senate passed Senate Bill 2467 on December 1,
1994). "When passed in December by a largely lame duck Congress, not one
comma was altered." Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1408 (commenting on lack of
changes to legislation after committee approval) (footnote omitted). The Senate
Report discusses the copyright provision for two pages while the House Report
does the same but only in a single paragraph. See Sobel, supra note 31, at 10.
When the White House presented its analysis of the proposed legislation, less than
twelve pages discussed copyrights. See id. President Clinton soon thereafter signed
House Bill 5110 into law. See Brown, supra note 4, at 54.
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little legislative history given the time limits, the court declined to
18 9
examine prior drafts.
By that same token, no jurisdictional element is evident in the
statutory language. 190 Even lacking those elements, a statute does
19 1
not necessarily fail Commerce Clause constitutional scrutiny.
This finding is not without its critics, as any copyright legislation
could theoretically find Commerce Clause support, eviscerating the
Copyright Clause's intent. 19 2 Additionally, while the court noted
that Congress enacted this legislation under the Copyright Clause's
189. For further discussion of the statutory draft of the legislation, see supra
notes 183-85 and accompanying text. Moghadam's holding suggests that even in
cases concerning fast-tracked legislation, the court may determine the congressional intent on its own, despite a complete lack of legislative history.
190. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 ("Section 2319A also contains no jurisdictional element as is commonly found in criminal statutes passed under authority of the Commerce Clause."). For example, a jurisdictional element would be
statutory language requiring that the bootleg copies traveled in interstate commerce. See id. (discussing various examples where jurisdictional element sustained
statute's constitutionality). The statutory drafts, discussed supra, also lacked ajurisdictional element indicative of Commerce Clause reliance. See Brown, supranote 4
(citing H.R. 4894, 103d Cong. § 102 (1994); S. 2368, 103d Cong. §§ 8-10 (1994)).
This is not surprising given that the final statutory language differs little from the
proposed legislation. See Brown, supra note 4, at 52 (noting similarities between
House Bill 5110 and House Bill 4894).
191. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275-76 (noting that lack of either jurisdictional or legislative factors does not automatically negate statute). For a discussion
of how the Moghadam court examined the federal anti-bootlegging statute without
substantive legislative history or any jurisdictional element, see supra notes 147-50
and accompanying text.
192. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 8.01 [C], at 8E-8 (commenting that if Congress may lawfully pass anti-bootlegging statute, "is there any amendment to copyright law it cannot make under the commerce banner?"); TRuIE, supra
note 79, § 5-4 ("The power to regulate 'commerce' necessarily encompasses power,
for whatever purpose it might be exercised, over all activities that are themselves
part of the production or distribution of wealth in the broadest economic sense of
that term, but not power over all activities, period.") (emphasis in original); Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1409, 1411 (questioning use of Commerce Clause to sustain
copyright legislation, commenting that "one seeks in vain for evidence that anyone
in Washington even considered the constitutional basis for [this statute]").
"[C]opyright has been transformed into an instrumentality towards [the world of
trade] ....
The orchestrator of that instrumentality... is the law of trade ....
[Clopyright now serves as an adjunct of trade . . . ." Nimmer, supra note 35, at

1412 (footnotes omitted); cf Goodwin, supra note 4, at 386 (noting need for new
standard for contributory copyright infringement actions if anti-bootlegging statute was not passed under Copyright Clause). But see Sobel, supra note 31, at 11-12
(praising Congress' willingness to implement copyright protection for all sorts of
unfixed works using the Commerce Clause). "[R]eliance on the Commerce
Clause to amend the Copyright Act opens the door to all types of additional
amendments.. . thought to be beyond the reach of copyright law." Id. at 12 (noting that lectures, dramatic performances, improvisational comedy and works involving effort but not traditional requirements of "creativity" such as databases and
alphabetized telephone directories may be granted copyright protection under
Commerce Clause).
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purview, the court found another constitutional basis supporting
the statute. 193 While this finding is not without precedent, it raises
the specter that any copyright legislation lacking similar elements
19 4
could find Commerce Clause redemption.
A similar apparition haunts the court's conclusion that Congress could pass a statute using one constitutional clause to avoid
another clause's limitations. 195 The court was wary that unfettered
approval of the statute would allow Congress to pass a statute, falling within the scope of one clause, under another, avoiding any
potential constitutional limitations of the first clause. 196 Given that
fear, however, the court adroitly avoided any pitfalls in determining
if and when Congress may pass a statute conflicting with one constitutional clause under another. 19 7 In holding that the Commerce
Clause may be used in limited circumstances to pass a statute violating the Copyright Clause precepts, the court distinguished a case
19 8
suggesting the opposite.
The court distinguished the holding from Railway LaborExecutives' Ass'n that the Commerce Clause could not sustain a statute
undermining the Bankruptcy Clause's authority. 199 Unlike the
Bankruptcy Clause barring non-uniform laws, the Moghadam court
193. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (asserting that Congress thought it was
acting under Copyright Clause); Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1409 (observing that all
prior enactments under Tide 17 derive constitutional authority from Copyright
Clause); cf. Deas, supranote 3, at 570 (noting questionable reliance by Congress on
Copyright Clause power).
194. See Appeals Court Backs Anti-Bootlegging Statute, supra note 139, at 3 (quoting David A. Nickerson, Moghadam's counsel, "[T] he appeals court ducked what
we clearly raised [in court]: If it's okay to assume that you can make copyright kind
of fights under the commerce clause, why do you need the copyright clause at
all?"). For further discussion of the effect of the Moghadam holding, see infra notes
215-17 and accompanying text. The Moghadamcourt noted in passing this possibility, commenting that "Congress would not be able to circumvent the originality
requirement inherent in the term "Writings" in the Copyright Clause by passing a
statute under the Commerce Clause which extended copyright-like protection to
unoriginal works." Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279 (citing Paul J. Heald, The Vices of
Originality, 1991 Sup. CT. REv. 143, 168-75 (1992)); see also 1 NIMMER ON COPYIGHT, supra note 31, § 1.09, at 1-66.41 (noting protection of unpublished works
would probably be unavailable under Commerce Clause "copyright" statute).
195. For an examination of the court's choice of the Commerce Clause over
the Copyright Clause, see infra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
196. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281 n.14, 1282 (taking great care in limiting
its holding to facts and reiterating its decision to not constitutionally invalidate
anti-bootlegging statute under Copyright Clause).
197. For an examination of Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n, see supranotes 16267 and accompanying text.
198. For discussion of the court's distinguishing of the Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n decision, see supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
199. For discussion of Railroad Labor Executives' Ass'n, see supra notes 162-67
and accompanying text.
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noted that the Copyright Clause does not restrict copyright legislation from passage under the Commerce Clause. 200 The court's
valid recognition of this both avoided constitutional conflict with
the Copyright Clause and protected the music industry from
20
theft. '
The court's analysis, however, relied on an assumption, not a
firm ruling, that the anti-bootlegging statute violates the Copyright
Clause. 20 2 In Authors League, the court failed to apply any Copyright
Clause analysis, sustaining the statute under the Commerce
Clause.2 0 3 The Moghadam court applied both a Copyright and
20 4
Commerce Clause analysis in finding Commerce Clause support.
Both the Authors League and Moghadam courts heard the argument
20 5
that the statute lacked Copyright Clause constitutional support.
It is unclear why the Moghadam court did not solely apply a Commerce Clause analysis similar to Authors League.20 6 Given the liberal
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, it appears that copyright
20 7
legislation would almost always find constitutional support.
200. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280 (holding that Copyright Clause does not
preclude Congress from granting quasi-copyright protection via other constitutional clauses to "Writing[s]" lacking fixation element). For a general discussion
of the requirements of the Copyright Clause, see supra notes 59-73. The court in
Moghadam asserted that "Writing" is not a limiting term, and it in no way limits
copyright legislation solely to the Copyright Clause. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at
1280. Injust two sentences, the court allowed other clauses to sustain constitutionally copyright legislation. For a discussion of the dangers of substituting the Commerce Clause in place of the Copyright Clause for copyright legislation, see supra
notes 191-94 and accompanying text. The court rationalized this assertion, noting
that copyright legislation passed under other clauses furthers the core purpose of
the Copyright Clause. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280.
201. For a discussion questioning the need to apply the Copyright Clause
analysis when the Commerce Clause can be used, see infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
202. For a discussion of cases that balanced the commerce power against copyright protection, see supra notes 129-72 and accompanying text.
203. For a discussion of the Authors League holding, see supra notes 103-05 and
accompanying text.
204. For a further explanation of the cases applied in Moghadam, see supra
notes 129-67 and accompanying text.
205. See Authors League, 790 F.2d at 224. Plaintiffs argued that the statute was
constitutionally invalid as it was "tenuously related to the goal [s]" of the Copyright
Clause. See id. The court declined to respond directly to this argument, instead
noting that the Commerce Clause justified this statute, regardless of the statute's
placement in the copyrights section of the United States Code. See id. For a discussion of the Moghadam statute's lack of a fundamental copyright element, see supra
notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of the Authors League holding, see supra notes 103-05 and
accompanying text.
207. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 n.12 (noting that "the Commerce
Clause could not be used to avoid a limitation in the Copyright Clause if the particular use of the Commerce Clause (e.g., the anti-bootlegging statute) were funda-
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IMPACT

Despite the noted constitutional flaws of the anti-bootlegging
statute and the problems inherent with passing copyright statutes
under the Commerce Clause, the court ruled properly. 20 8 Perhaps
the court was aware of the negative economic impact that bootleg
recordings have on the music industry. 20 9 There were several possible outcomes of this case. 210 If the court had affirmatively ruled the
anti-bootlegging statute constitutional under the Copyright Clause,
that would have violated two hundred years of legal tradition requiring fixation. 21 1 The music industry would be left to rely on
state statutory protection against bootlegs if the court ruled the statute unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause.2 1 2 If the court
applied only the Commerce Clause analysis, but found lacking a
substantial effect upon commerce, the music industry would remain without federal protection.2 1 3 The court essentially was almost waylaid into following this path, balancing public policy
against the requirements of law. The Moghadam court, nevertheless, did not affirmatively settle the issue raised by both parties and
scholarly commentators alike, namely the anti-bootlegging statute's
214
constitutionality under the Copyright Clause.
The Moghadam court's decision, despite those issues, is sound,
lightly stepping through a constitutional minefield in choosing to
grant live musical performances quasi-copyright protection.2 1 5 The
court, caught between maintaining the public policy need of
mentally inconsistent with the particular limitation in the Copyright Clause (e.g.,
the fixation requirement)"). If the court found the anti-bootlegging statute lacked
the limited time requirement of the Copyright Clause, the Commerce Clause
could not pass the statute. See id. at 1281 n.14. For a discussion of the court's
handling of the Commerce Clause, see supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
208. For a discussion of the difficult choice the Moghadam court faced, see
supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
209. For a discussion of bootlegs' detrimental impact upon the music industry, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
210. For a discussion of the impact of alternative holdings such as upholding
the statute under the Copyright Clause, see infra notes 211-13 and accompanying
text.
211. For a discussion of the inherent requirement of fixation in copyright
laws, see supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
212. For a list of states that classify bootlegging as a felony, see supranote 29.
213. For a discussion of the negative economic impact of bootlegged recordings upon music industry, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
214. For a discussion of the failure by the court to settle the statute's constitutionality under the Copyright Clause, see supra notes 129-39 and accompanying
text.
215. For an examination of the protection granted under the Commerce
Clause, see supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
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criminalizing bootlegging and judicial case law holding fixation a
copyright clause elemental requirement, composed a decision that
fulfilled public need without directly conflicting with two centuries
of constitutional law. 2 16 The music industry received what it requested: copyright protection for live musical performances. The
judicial system also received what it wanted: a decision not conflicting with two centuries of case law. The court placed an analytical
facade over the anti-bootlegging statute's constitutionality under
the Copyright Clause, not affirmatively resolving all the raised constitutional issues. 2 17 Instead, the Moghadam court declined to rule
directly via a Copyright Clause analysis upon the anti-bootlegging
statute's constitutionality.2 18 As the curtain rises on the twenty-first
century and original works of intellectual labor are composed in
non-tangible media, fundamental alterations must be orchestrated
for continued Copyright Clause effectiveness. The Eleventh Circuit
cleverly composed a decision that avoided tortuous legal brambles
to a finale amenable to both sides. The next court to decide a similar issue may be unable to, and given the appropriate facts, may be
forced to re-interpret the Copyright Clause for the twenty-first century.
Keith V Lee
216. For further discussion of the impact of an unconstitutional ruling, see
supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
217. For further discussion of the analytical facade by the Moghadam court,
see supra notes 182-94 and accompanying text.
218. For a discussion of the Moghadam court's analysis, see supranotes 126-39
and accompanying text.
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